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I. INTRODUCTION
Parallel importation of goods, also known as grey marketing of

goods, is the importation of genuine goods into a country by an
enterprise other than the trademark owner or exclusive importer
for that country.' Parallel importation has been disputed for almost a century.2 It continues to be a source of controversy because of increased competition from foreign importation resulting
from a strong United States dollar in the world market.3 Parallel
1. 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30.35 (2d ed.
1984).
2. See, e.g., Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1886).
3. Driscoll, Parallel Imports: What Can the United States Trademark
Owner Do?, in CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADEMARK LAW AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 1984 153, 155 (1984).
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importers purchase goods overseas, import them to the United
States and sell them at prices lower than goods imported through
normal channels. 4 Some estimates indicate that retail sales from
parallel imports in the United States exceed six billion dollars a
year.5
United States trademark owners and the exclusive distributors
of foreign goods claim that parallel importation is eroding their
markets." They further argue that: (1) parallel imports deprive a
manufacturer of product distribution control; (2) parallel importers benefit unfairly from a distributor's investment in product
promotion; and (3) parallel imports mislead consumers to believe
that the purchased products are covered by a manufacturer's warranty.7 Supporters of parallel importation contend, however, that
restraints on the importation of genuine goods should not exist in
a free trade society.8 They also assert that protecting exclusive
distributors allows those distributors to set minimum retail
prices, contributing to higher prices for United States consumers.'
This Note analyzes the various approaches and statutory interpretations used by courts, Congress, and administrative agencies
to resolve this complex issue. This Note also examines approaches
used to resolve recent controversies involving parallel importation. Finally, the possible options for the permanent resolution of
the controversy will be discussed.
II. LEGAL HISTORY
A.

The Functions of Trademarks

Section 45 of the Lanham Act 10 defines trademark as "any
word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his
goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
others.""' Trademarks are used to (1) indicate the origin or source
4.
5.
(Jan.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See id.
Boyer, The Assault on the Right to Buy Cheap Imports, 111 FORTUNE 89
7, 1985).
Driscoll, supra note 3, at 155.
Boyer, supra note 4, at 89.'
Id.
Id.
Trade-Mark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 95-410, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
11.

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
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of the article, (2) guarantee the quality of the article, and (3) advertise the article.12 Early users considered indication of origin to
be the trademark's most important function. The origin indicated
by a trademark, however, may not always be the manufacturer. A
trademark may name a retailer, importer, jobber, or commission
merchant as the supplier of the goods. 13 Alternatively, the source
may not be ascertainable by reference to the trademark. The
trademark may signify only that any good bearing that mark is
associated with or sponsored by the same source.' Likewise,
guarantee of quality does not assure the buyer that all articles
exhibit a certain level of quality. Quality guarantees only assure
the buyer that all goods sold under the mark are of equal and
consistent quality."5 A trademark may advertise a product in two
ways. First, a consumer familiar with a trademark product perceives the mark as a symbol of the producer's efficiency and reliability. Second, the trademark serves as an advertisement for the
consumer by fixing the identity of the article and the name of the
producer in the consumer's mind. The consumer later recalls the
6
mark when seeking that product.
Analysis of parallel importation involves discussion of three
competing legal theories: universality or trade identity, territoriality, and exhaustion. Under the theory of universality or trade
identity, a trademark is viewed only as an indication of the product's origin.' 7 This theory does not recognize the trademark functions of guarantee of quality or advertising. 18
The theory of territoriality is based on the premise that a
trademark is effective only in the country in which it is registered.' 9 Territoriality renders the genuineness of the goods immaterial in determining whether those goods infringe a registered

12. 3 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MoNOPOLIES § 17.01 (4th ed. 1983); 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 3:3-3:5.

13. 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 12, § 17.02.
14. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:3.
15. 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 12, § 17.03.
16. Id. § 17.04. For thorough discussions of the functions of trademarks, see
3

R. CALLMANN,

supra note 12,

§§ 17.01-17.04; 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, 88

3:3-3:5.
17. 3A R. CALLMANN, supra note 12, § 21.17.
18. Id. Apollinaris and other early parallel import cases used this theory.
See infra text accompanying notes 25-28, 30-34.
19. 3A R. CALLMANN, supra note 12, § 21.17.
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trademark.20
The theory of exhaustion states that after a trademarked article has been sold for the first time the "right to future control
over the goods on the basis of the trademark is 'exhausted' and
the trademark owner has no further rights."'" Under this theory,
once the product has left the possession of the trademark owner
he may no longer put any conditions on its future sale or importation on the basis of the trademark.
In a trademark dispute between importers and trademark owners, the importer should prevail under the universality theory because the ultimate source of the product is the same. The product
merely reaches the consumer through different channels.22 Under
the territoriality theory, the domestic owner of the trademark
would always prevail because he is the owner of the mark,
whether the goods are genuine or not.23 Under the exhaustion
theory, the importer of parallel goods should prevail because the
seller would have no control over the goods after they have been
24
sold.

B. Early Decisions and Statutory Law
In Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer,25 the first significant United
States parallel importation case, the court concluded that no
trademark infringement occurred. In Apollinaris, the plaintiff
contracted with a bottler of mineral water for the exclusive right
to import the water into the United States. This contract included the right to use the trademark HUNYADI JANOS. A
third party, the defendant, purchased the bottled water in Germany and then imported the water into the United States. Only
the labels of the goods differed; the plaintiff's bottle labels stated
that the plaintiff was the sole importer while the defendant's labels contained a caution against purchasing the water in the
20. Id. The Supreme Court first applied the theory of territoriality in A.

Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). See infra text accompanying notes
39-41. This theory was subsequently applied in almost every other case involving

parallel imports. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
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United States. 26 The court recognized that the defendant's acts
deprived the plaintiff of "substantial advantages which it expected to obtain from the privilege transferred to it . . " Yet,
the court found no trademark infringement because the goods
were genuine and the public was not being deceived about the
source of the imported water.28
Congressional enactment of Section 27 of the Trademark Act of
1905 altered statutory law governing parallel importation. This
section provides:
That no article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of.any domestic manufacture ...

[or manufacturer

or trader in a foreign country that provides similar privileges for
United States citizens], or which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or
shall bear a name or mark calculated to induce the public to believe that the article is manufactured in the United States. .. [or
in a location other than where it is actually manufactured] ...
shall be admitted to entry at any custom-house of the United
States ....

29

Early cases held that the importation of parallel goods by third
parties did not violate section 27.30 In A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,3 1 the plaintiff owned the United States trademark registrations for use on a face powder manufactured by a French company. The defendant purchased the powder in Europe and
imported it for sale in the United States. 32 The court of appeals
found the defendant's importation did not constitute trademark
26. Id. at 19.
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id. at 20. The court further determined that the plaintiff's right to exclusive sale was not violated because the bottler was not importing the goods and
the evidence failed to show that the bottler was trying to defeat the plaintiff's
exclusive right. Id. at 20-22.
29. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 724, 730 (emphasis added)
(reenacted in 1946 in substantially the same form by the Lanham Act, § 42
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1124)).
30. See, e.g., Fred Gretsch Mfg. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780, 782 (2d Cir. 1916).
The Second Circuit found that the purpose of section 27 was to protect the public from goods that were not genuine. Id. Because the goods were genuine, the
court held that they did not "copy or simulate" the trademark and did not defeat the purposes underlying the statute. Id.
31. 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). For a discussion of
the Supreme Court's reversal, see infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
32. 275 F. at 539-40.
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infringement because the goods were genuine and did not confuse
the public about their origin.3 3 The court stated that trademarks
are intended to show the ultimate origin of the goods without any
time limitation; therefore, if the goods sold are genuine and are
manufactured under the trademark, parallel importation is not an
infringement."
Before the Supreme Court reversed Katzel, Congress reacted to
the decision by attempting to solve the problem of parallel importation through legislation. 5 Less than a year after Katzel, Congress enacted section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922, which
provides:
It shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign,
print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trade-mark owned
by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United States .

.

. unless written consent of the

owner36of such trade-mark is produced at the time of making
entry.
Although Congress' purpose was to ensure that the result reached
in Katzel would be overturned, 37 the applicability of section 526
33. Id. at 543.
34. Id.
35. See Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise - The
Role of the United States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADE-MARK RFP. 301, 303-05
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Import Restrictions]; Note, Trade-Mark Infringement: The Power of an American Trade-Mark Owner to Prevent the Importation of the Authentic Product Manufactured by a Foreign Company, 64 YALE
L. J. 557, 566 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Trade-Mark Infringement].
36. Ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975 (1922). This section was reenacted as
section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982)). In
1978, Congress excepted from § 1526(a) items brought into the country for personal use. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d) (1982).
37. A conference report on section 526 stated:
A recent decision of the circuit court of appeals holds that existing law
does not prevent the importation of merchandise bearing the same trademark as merchandise of the United States, if the imported merchandise is
genuine and if there is no fraud upon the public. [Section 526] makes such
importation unlawful without the consent of the owner of the American
trade-mark....
H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922). In Senate debate, Senator
Moses objected to the section because "its main purpose will be to interfere with
litigation now going on; and I protest that the Congress of the United States
should not be used for the purpose of advancing the cause of litigants or attorneys." 62 CONG. REC. 11,585, 11,604 (1922). In a 1923 decision, Judge Learned
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to other circumstances is less certain.38
Hand noted that section 526 "was intended only to supply the casus omissus,
supposed to exist in section 27 [of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905], because of the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in [Katzel]. Had the Supreme Court
reversed that decision last spring, [section 526] would not have been enacted at
all." Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., 292 F. 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1923).
38. The Senate debate, which was limited to 10 minutes, involved discussion
of many situations that might be affected by section 526. 62 CONG. REc. 11,585
(1922). Senator McCumber, a supporter of the section, illustrated situations he
felt the section would cover:
I will take Bayer's aspirin. Suppose not only the patent but the trademark, which is "Bayer's Aspirin" with a red cross, is sold to an American
concern outright. The patent will defend against any importations so long
as the patent lasts; but suppose, now, the patent expires. Then the German firm, notwithstanding that they have sold all rights, including the
trade-mark, begin to ship in Bayer's Aspirin with the same kind of a
trade-mark that they had before, although the right is owned in the
United States. According to the decision that was read by the Senator
from West Virginia the American purchasers of these rights are entirely
unprotected, and this is to give the opportunity to protect the American
purchaser.
Id. at 11,604. Senator Sutherland argued that the section protected United
States citizens, to whom foreigners sold trademarks, from parallel importation
by the the trademark seller. See id. at 11,603.
The opposing side countered with an illustration of a foreign manufacturer
using a United States agent:
We will assume that Pears' soap . .. is not registered in the United
States. It is sold in the general markets throughout the world, but the
makers of Pears' soap desire a monopoly in the United States. They have
American agents who register a trade-mark of Pears' soap here in the
United States.
I want to inquire whether any American could purchase Pears' soap
abroad and import it without the written consent of their agent here in the
United States, and if not, why not? There is no fraud, no deceit. It is the
same identical article, with the trade-mark registered here protecting the
maker of the article.
Id. at 11,605 (statement of Sen. Lenroot). Senator McCumber responded that if
no transfer of the mark occurred, no real problem existed. He said, "the mere
fact of a foreigner having a trade-mark and registering that trade-mark in the
United States, and selling the goods in the United States through an agency, of
course, would not be affected by this provision." Id.
Whether Congress really intended the legislation to cover the fact situation in
Katzel is uncertain. The importer in Katzel was a third party, not the manufacturer of the goods. Katzel, 275 F. at 539-40. During debate Senator Sutherland
stated, "I believe that the Senate is in favor of protecting the property rights of
American citizens who have purchased trade-marks from foreigners, and when
these foreigners deliberately violate the property rights of those to whom they
have sold these trade-marks by shipping over to this country goods under those
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Shortly after enactment of section 526, the Supreme Court reversed the Katzel decision.3 9 In reaching its decision, the Court
made no mention of the newly enacted section 526. The Court,
however, found that trademark infringement existed. In writing
for the Court, Justice Holmes reasoned that an infringement
should be found because the statute authorizing assignments of
trademarks would not allow the manufacturer to import the merchandise; therefore, any importation, even by a third party, constitutes an infringement.40 Justice Holmes also stated that the
public connected the product with the United States trademark
owner even though the goods were manufactured in France. Applying the territoriality theory of trademarks, Holmes wrote:
[I]t is said that the trade-mark here is that of the French house
and truly indicates the origin of the goods. But that is not accurate. It is the trade-mark of the plaintiff only in the United States
and indicates in law, and, it is found, by public understanding, that
the goods come from the plaintiff although not made by it. It was
sold and could only be
sold with the good will of the business that
41
the plaintiff brought.
Several months after the Katzel reversal, the Supreme Court
decided another parallel importation case. This case held that
section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 requires the same result
that was reached in Katzel.42 Under a factual situation similar to
Katzel, the Court found that genuine imported goods copied or
identical trade-marks." 62

CONG. REc. at 11,603. Senator McCumber mischaracterized the facts in Katzel when he stated that the court "held that a
trade-mark did not protect a party at all against importations of the article from

the very firm which sold it...... Id. at 11,605. Some commentators assert that

Congress intended section 526 to protect only independent United States trademark owners. See, e.g., Trade-Mark Infringement, supra note 35, at 566.
39. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
40. Id. at 691-92.
41. Id. at 692. Holmes supplemented his comments in Katzel in a later

decision:
A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit use of it so far as to protect
the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his. ...
When the mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public we see no
such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth. It is

not taboo.
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (citations omitted). The con-

cept that a trademark creates independent goodwill separate from that of the
manufacturer continued to play an important role in future decisions.
42. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam).
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simulated the plaintiff's trademark within the meaning of section
27, thus giving a statutory basis for the prohibition of parallel
imports. 43
Subsequent courts have interpreted the provisions of section
526 of the Tariff Act more broadly than those of section 27 of the
Trade-Mark Act, thus giving greater protection to trademark
owners. 44 In 1931, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the importation from Europe of a used automobile that was intended for personal use would violate the provisions of the Tariff
Act because the automobile might ultimately be resold in the
United States.45 The court found that, in enacting the Tariff Act,
Congress had adopted a protectionist policy for the United States
owners of foreign trademarks. 46 The court then followed its determination of congressional intent and held that the automobile
bearing the plaintiff's trademark could not be allowed into the
United States.47
C.

Customs' Interpretation of Section 526

Section 526 of the Tariff Act is subject to interpretation not
only by courts, but also by the Unites States Customs Service. 48
The major issue is whether a United States business can invoke
provisions of section 526 to prevent the importation of goods
manufactured by a related company. 49 Although section 526 provides no exceptions for related companies,50 the Customs Service
has provided some exceptions. Customs views Congress' intent in
enacting section 526 as providing protection to United States

43. Import Restrictions, supra note 35, at 305. In this case, the plaintiff in
Katzel sued a Collector of Customs. Id.
44. Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods
is Not a Trademark Problem, 49 TRADE-MARK REP. 707, 711 (1959).
45. Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931).
46. Id. at 1038.
47. Id. In 1978, Congress added subsection (d) to section 526 to except goods
imported for personal use and not resold within one year. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d)
(1982).
48. The Customs regulations are codified at 19 C.F.R. §§ 1330.0-1330.24

(1985).
49. Kuhn, Remedies Available at Customs for Infringement of a Registered
Trademark, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 387, 394 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Remedies
Available]. For a further discussion of "related" company, see infra note 58 and
accompanying text.
50. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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firms against fraud from foreign assignors of trademarks.5 1 Under
this interpretation, Customs then attempts to determine the true
controlling force over the trademark rather than using the literal
words of section 526.52 In 1936, Customs amended its regulations
to provide that merchandise manufactured or sold in a foreign
country under a trademark registered in the United States would
not be deemed to copy or simulate the United States trademark if
the same person or business entity owns both trademarks. 3
In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act which replaced the
Trade-Mark Act of 1905. Section 27 of the 1905 act was reenacted
with only minor changes as section 42 of the Lanham Act.5 4 From

1938 until its passage in 1946 it appeared as if the Lanham Act
would combine all laws relating to trademarks and clarify the discrepancy with section 526 of the Tariff Act.5 5 In the bill's final
report, however, the section that would have repealed section 526
of the Tariff Act was deleted. 5
In 1953, the Customs Service again amended its regulations relating to imports under section 526 of the Tariff Act. The amendment added the words "or by a related company as defined in
section 45 of the [Lanham Act]" to the exception which applies
when a trademark registered in two countries is owned by the
same company.57 A few years later, United States v. Guerlain,
Inc., 8 significantly affected Custom's interpretation of section
51. See Import Restrictions,supra note 35, at 305-06.
52. See id.
53. T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336, 337 (1936). The amended regulation provided that such merchandise:
shall not be deemed for the purpose of these regulations to copy or simulate such United States trade-mark or trade name if such foreign trademark or trade name and such United States trade-mark or trade name are
owned by the same person, partnership,association,or corporation.
Id. (emphasis added).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982). For the earlier provision, see supra text accompanying note 29.
55. Import Restrictions, supra note 35, at 306.
56. Id.
57. T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. 376, 384 (1953). See supra note 53 for the
section as amended in 1936. In section 45 of the Lanham Act, related company
is defined as "any person who legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in respect to the nature and quality of the
goods or services in connection with which the mark is used." 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1982).

58. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated and remanded 358 U.S. 915
(1958), dismissed 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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526 as that section relates to excluding articles from importation. 59 In Guerlain, the government contended that United States
companies owning trademarks for certain perfumes, manufactured in France by foreign closely-related companies, were violating section 2 of the Sherman Act by using the provisions of section 526 to prevent importation of genuine goods from other
countries.6 0 Defining the relevant market as the toilet goods of
each defendant rather than toilet goods generally, the Guerlain
court found that the defendants' use of section 526 of the Tariff

Act had prevented the importation of toilet goods bearing the
Guerlain trademarks that were manufactured, sold, and distributed abroad by French Guerlain.6 1 The court found that the defendants had invoked the protection of section 526 to exclude
competition and control price levels in violation of section 2 of
the Sherman Act.6 2 The court determined that the provisions of
section 526 did not protect a United States company which is
part of a single international enterprise from competition with a
foreign subsidiary of the enterprise whose goods bear the same

trademark as goods manufactured, sold, and distributed by the
United States company in the United States.6 3
In 1959, Customs amended its regulations again, this time deleting the provision concerning related companies as defined by
section 45 of the Lanham Act.6 4 Where the foreign trademark and
59. Remedies Available, supra note 49, at 394.
60. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 79-80. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony...
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
61. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 90.
62. Id. at 90-91.
63. Id. at 91. The Justice Department had the case dismissed when it
reached the Supreme Court even though the trial court had ruled in the government's favor. The Justice Department believed that the problem could be solved
more effectively by legislative action. Import Restrictions,supra note 35, at 30607. The legislation clearly would have stated that the importation of genuine
goods produced by an affiliate of the United States owner was not prohibited
under trademark law. Id. at 307. The Celler Bill, introduced in 1959, would have
removed the protection from imports for related companies. Id. For a discussion
of the Celler Bill, which was never passed, see Remedies Available, supra note
49, at 395.
64. T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433 (1959). Deletion of the provision was a
result of the government's withdrawal from the Guerlain case. Import Restric-

554

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:543

United States trademark were owned by the same person or corporation, however, the exclusionary protection was still denied."5
Present Customs regulations, unchanged since 1972, restrict
importation of an article bearing a trademark that copies or simulates a trademark, or is identical to a trademark, owned by a
United States citizen or corporation.

6

A subsection of the regula-

tions provides, however, that certain restrictions do not apply
when the foreign and domestic trademarks are owned by the
same business entity, when the owners of the trademarks are subject to common ownership or control, when the trademark is authorized by the United States trademark owner, or when the
mark is destroyed before importation.17 Additionally, the Custions, supra note 35, at 310.
65. Import Restrictions,supra note 35, at 310; see supra text accompanying
note 53.
66. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a)-(b) (1984). These sections provide:
(a) Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign or domestic manufacture bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded
trademark or trade name shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture as prohibited importations. A "copying or simulating" mark or name
is an actual counterfeit of the recorded mark or name or is one which so
resembles it as to be likely to cause the public to associate the copying or
simulating mark with the recorded mark or name.
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark
identical with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or
a corporation or association created or organized within the United States
are subject to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
Id.
67. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1984). Subsection (c) provides:
(c) Restrictions not applicable.The restrictions set forth in paragraphs
(a) and (b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned
by the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control (see §§ 133.2(d) and 133.12(d));
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or
trade name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner;
(4) The objectionable mark is removed or obliterated prior to
importation ....

Id. In determining whether import restrictions would not apply under section
133.21(c)(2), common ownership means "individual or aggregate ownership of
more than 50 percent of the business entity," and common control means "effective control in policy and operations and is not necessarily synonymous with
common ownership." Id. § 133.2(d). The United States Trademark Association
(USTA) expressed its dissatisfaction with §§ 133.21(c) and 133.2(d) when Cus-
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toms Service will not allow exclusion of genuine goods if the

United States trademark owner has licensed foreign use of the
mark. 8
III.

RECENT DECISIONS

A. Parfums Stern
In Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service,69 the
owner of the United States trademark for Oscar de la Renta
moved for an injunction to halt the importation of perfumes bearing its trademark. 70 The court found that the plaintiff was a "cog
or entity" in an international conglomerate that controlled the
manufacture and sale of Oscar de la Renta fragrance products
toms proposed them in 1970. The USTA asserted that Congress intended section 526 to provide the protection of the statute "without regard to whether
other corporate entities authorize or are authorized to use or record the trademark." Letter from Nathaniel G. Sims, President of the USTA, to Myles J. Ambrose, Commissioner of Customs (Apr. 7, 1971) (discussing the proposed changes
in Customs' regulations). Sims also stated that Congress' failure to pass the Celler Bill, which would have denied use of the Trademark Act to exclude imports,
expressed the legislative branch's true views on exclusion of parallel imports. Id.
68. T.D. 69-12(2), 3 Cust. B. & Dec. 17 (1969). For a thorough discussion of
the Customs regulations, see Remedies Available, supra note 49; Import Restrictions, supra note 35.

In considering a Customs procedural reform bill in 1978, a House report
stated of section 526:
This section has been consistently interpreted by the United States Customs Service for the past 20 years as excluding from protection foreignproduced merchandise bearing a genuine trademark created, owned, and
registered by a citizen of the United States if the foreign producer has
been authorized by the American trademark owners to produce and sell
abroad goods bearing the recorded trademark. Protection is accorded
under section 526 to trademark owners if an attempt is made to import
such merchandise in violation of an agreement authorizing the foreign producers to sell only to the trademark owner. In addition, if merchandise
bears a genuine trademark created outside the United States the rights to
which have been assigned to and recorded by a United States citizen, protection is also granted.
H. R. REP. No. 621, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1977).
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 expressly excludes parallel imports
from coverage. Parallel imports were not considered counterfeit because the
trademark was placed on the goods with the consent of the trademark owner. 28
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 715, 716 (1984).

69. 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
70. Id. at 418.
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throughout the world. 71 Eighteen consignments of goods that had
been imported into the United States through the parallel market
were in the custody of the Customs Service. 72 After noting the
prerequisites for issuing a preliminary injunction," the court
found that the plaintiff had not shown a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits because the Lanham .Act protections
were not designed to apply to that situation.74 The court stated
that it recognized the validity of the decision in Katzel 5 but distinguished that decision from the present one because Katzel involved a domestic company purchasing the trademark from a foreign manufacturer and then staking its reputation on the
character of the goods.76 The court also distinguished Bell &
Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. 7

by finding that

Parfums Stern involved a single international enterprise, whereas
no evidence of common ownership or control was shown in Bell &
Howell: Mamiya.7 8 The Parfums Stern court further found little
chance that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm because,
while the plaintiff had been aware of the problem of parallel imports for several years, the plaintiff had never before sought to
protect its rights. 79 Balancing the potential injury to the parties,

the court found that defendants would suffer greater harm than
the plaintiff would because defendants had imported the merchandise on the basis of the plaintiff's apparent acquiescence to
the practice, and the issuance of a preliminary injunction might
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 419. The prerequisites the court noted are:
(1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits;
(2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the

injunction is not granted;
(3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened

harm the injunction may do to the defendant; and
(4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disservice the public

interest.
Id.
74. Id.
75. 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
76. Parfums, 575 F. Supp. at 419. For a discussion of the Katzel decision, see
supra notes 31-34, 39-41 and accompanying text.
77. 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
See infra note 111 for a discussion of the Bell & Howell: Mamiya decision.
78. Parfums, 575 F. Supp. at 419-20.
79. Id. at 420.
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cause defendants to default on delivery orders.80 Finally, the
court found that issuance of a preliminary injunction would not
benefit the public because the plaintiff would probably guarantee
the imported goods, and "there is adequate evidence that the
public has the benefit of lower prices in that those products offered by the [defendants] are usually less expensive than those
sold by Plaintiff through its authorized distributors."81 For these
reasons, the court denied the issuance of a preliminary
82

injunction.

B. The Vivitar Cases
In Vivitar Corp. v. United States,s3 a United States trademark

owner sought a declaratory judgment requiring the Customs Ser80. Id. at 420-21.
81. Id. at 421.
82.

Id.

83. 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
In an earlier decision, the Court of International Trade (CIT)determined that
it had exclusive jurisdiction in this case. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F.
Supp. 1419 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In that
dispute, the defendant contested the court's jurisdiction and contended that the
CIT did not have jurisdiction. Id. at 1422. 22 U.S.C. § 1581 defines the jurisdiction of the CIT. The CIT first stated that its jurisdiction is intended to reach
international trade disputes. Id. at 1422. The defendants argued that the case
primarily involved trademark law, and that the district courts have original jurisdiction over trademark cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Id.
The court stated that it would have jurisdiction if the "thrust of the grievance
alleged and the relief sought by the plaintiff relates to the regulations promulgated by customs and their administration and enforcement." Id. at 1422-23
(quoting Schaper Mfg. v. Regan, 566 F. Supp. 894, 896 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983)).
The CIT found that the central issue was "the regulation of international trade
in goods bearing genuine trademarks," not trademark law. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp.
at 1423. The court then stated that the CIT's purpose is to avoid differing interpretations of international trade law that might lead to uncertainty or forum
shopping among the district courts. Id. at 1423. Therefdre, the court concluded
that it had jurisdiction. Id. at 1427. In affirming the decision, the appellate court
stated that if the plaintiff had sought a determination of its rights as against an
importer, the matter should be settled in district court. Vivitar Corp. v. United
States, 761 F.2d at 1560. Where the subject matter is the validity of the regulations or procedures under the regulations, however, the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
The plaintiff had also based part of its claim on section 42 of the Lanham Act.
The court dismissed this claim and did not transfer the dismissed claim to the
appropriate district court. 585 F. Supp. at 1427 n.16. The court noted that the
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vice to exclude all imports bearing the owner's mark.8 The plaintiff, a California corporation, granted licenses to foreign manufacturers for use of the VIVITAR trademark on photographic
equipment.8 5 The equipment manufactured in the foreign countries was marketed outside the United States by the plaintiff's
wholly owned subsidiaries.8 6 Although the plaintiff's subsidiaries
were not licensed to market the goods in the United States,
equipment manufactured by the foreign licensees was imported
7
on the parallel market.
The Court of International Trade (CIT) primarily discussed the
proper construction of section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930
and the Customs Service's interpretation of that statute."8 If Customs' interpretation is reasonable, the CIT would uphold it because courts will defer to a statutory interpretation by the proper
administrative agency." The CIT stated that Customs' interpretation would be given greater deference because Customs has consistently maintained its interpretation, and Congress appeared to
have accepted that interpretation while amending section 526.90
The CIT declared that the sole intent of Congress in enacting section 526 was to resolve the problem created by the lower court
decision in Katzel.91 According to the court, the legislative purpose underlying the Tariff Act was protection of United States
industry from the competitive advantage of foreign industry.92
plaintiff's claim was not substantially based on section 42 of the Lanham Act
and that transfer would not be in the interest of justice. Id.
On the same day, the CIT allowed 47th Street Photo to participate in this
action as defendant-intervenor. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp.
1415 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). The court also allowed K Mart Corporation to participate as amicus curiae. Id.
84. Id. at 422. Although the plaintiff's complaint sought relief in the nature
of mandamus, the plaintiff later conceded that declaratory relief would be adequate. Id. at 422 n.1.
85. Id. at 422.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 423.
88. Id. at 425. For the text of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, see supra
text accompanying note 36.

89. 593 F. Supp. at 433. The court also stated that Customs' interpretation
does not have to be the only reasonable interpretation or even reach the same

result as if the question of interpretation had first arisen in the court. Id.
90. Id. at 434.
91. Id. For a discussion of the court of appeal's decision in Katzel, see supra

notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
. 92.

Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 434-35. The CIT hypothesized a situation
in
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The court found that Customs' interpretation was reasonable and
that this interpretation would avoid results Congress clearly did
not intend.93
The CIT next addressed the plaintiff's contention that Customs' interpretation was unreasonable because it allows the parallel importer to exploit the trademark owner's goodwill.94 The
plaintiff argued that parallel importers are allowed a "free ride"
on the plaintiff's reputation and advertising.9 5 The court responded to the plaintiff's argument by stating that section 526
was not intended to deal with that problem and that the court
would not interpret the section so broadly. The court also stated
that if a plaintiff was suffering from unfair competition, relief
might be available under the Lanham Act or other laws.
Finally, the CIT would not invalidate Customs' interpretation
of section 526 because it found the interpretation to be reasonable and that substantial commercial reliance had been placed on
the interpretation.98 The court again noted that Congress had acquiesced to the Customs' interpretation, even though it was controversial.99 The court stated that determination of "whether the
current balance in trademark rights in international commerce is
inappropriate" is a decision best made by Congress. 100

which the application of section 526 could result in an unfair competitive advantage for a foreign manufacturer, a situation Congress could not have intended:
Since [section 526(a)] only applies to goods manufactured abroad, the
American manufacturer would not be able to employ [section 526(a)] to
restrict unauthorized imports of its goods sold by its overseas distributors .... But the foreign manufacturer could form an American subsidiary corporation, transfer the American trademark rights to that corporation, and then have the subsidiary use [section 526(a)] to restrict any
unauthorized imports of the foreign manufacturer's goods. The only way
an American trademark owner could overcome this marketing advantage is
by moving its manufacturing operations abroad so it too could restrict access to the United States market.
Id. at 434.
93. Id. at 434.
94. Id. at 435.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 436. The court expressly declined to rule on whether it has jurisdiction to grant relief on a claim of unfair competition. Id. at 436 n.24.
98. Id. at 436. The court noted that business had been conducted in reliance
on the Customs Service's interpretation. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision but narrowed the holding. 0 1 In
reviewing the legislative history of section 526, the appellate court
found that reversal of Katzel was not the sole purpose of the section. 10 2 The court concluded that no limitations can be read into
the statute based on Congressional intent at the time of enactment. 10 3 The court of appeals also found that Customs' regulations have not been consistent, and, therefore, the "long standing
administrative interpretation" argument does not provide a suitable basis for statutory interpretation. 0 4 The appellate court also
refuted the argument that Congress had ratified Customs' actions, stating that legislation by silent ratification is a tenuous
theory that does not merit extended discussion.10 5 The court of
appeals concluded that the regulations merely define Customs'
role in enforcement of the Tariff Act.10 6 The court determined
that the regulations, viewed in such a manner, are not contrary to
the statute, and that Customs is not required to exclude all grey
market goods. 107 Finally, the court found that the plaintiff was
free to pursue a determination of its rights against parallel importers in a federal district court. 08 If the plaintiff is successful,
he could then have the goods excluded by Customs. 0 9
C. Osawa
Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo110 is the most recent case in a
series of decisions involving the plaintiff,"' owner of the United
101. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 1561.
103. Id. at 1565.
104. Id. at 1568.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1569.
107. Id. at 1569-70.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1570.
110. 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
111. Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). All cases
involve the United States owner of the Mamiya trademark who is trying to exclude parallel importation of cameras. In the first decision, Bell & Howell:

Mamiya (now Osawa & Co.) was granted a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants' sale of cameras with the Mamiya trademark. Masel, 548 F. Supp. at
1065.
The defendant argued against the injunction on trademark and antitrust
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States trademark registration for the Mamiya mark for photographic equipment manufactured by the Mamiya Camera Company.11 2 Defendants were discount camera dealers who allegedly
advertise, sell and import Mamiya products in violation of an exclusion order. 1 3 0 sawa-Japan, the exclusive worldwide distributor of Mamiya products, had granted exclusive United States distribution rights to the plaintiff.1 1 4 The Customs Service granted
the plaintiff an order of exclusion barring all unauthorized imports of goods bearing the Mamiya trademarks. 1 5 The plaintiff
moved for a preliminary injunction to bar the defendants from
advertising and dealing in Mamiya products. 1 6 The court found

grounds. Id. at 1067. The defendant asserted that, because the plaintiff is closely
linked to the owners and users of the foreign trademarks, the court should have
distinguished Katzel and denied the preliminary injunction. Id. at 1066. The
defendant argued that the plaintiff was part of a unified international enterprise
so there was neither likelihood of confusion, false designation of origin, dilution
nor unfair competition for which relief existed. Id. The defendant also argued
that, because of the international control of the trademark, the plaintiff
achieved a worldwide restraint on the flow of medium format camera equipment. Id. at 1067-68. The court determined that the case should be decided on
the basis of trademark law. Id. at 1079. The court then found that, since there
was a substantial likelihood of confusion, an injunction should be granted. Id.
The court of appeals in Masel vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. Masel, 719 F.2d at 43. To obtain a preliminary injunction, the
Second Circuit required a showing of "(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1)
likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to
the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships
tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief." Id. at 45.
The appellate court disagreed with the district court's finding that a substantial
likelihood of confusion existed in this case. Id. at 45-46. Finding insufficient factual support for irreparable injury, the appellate court vacated the preliminary
injunction and remanded the case. Id. The court of appeals indicated that because there was little chance for confusion concerning the origin of the goods
there would be no irreparable injury. Id. For a discussion of the Masel decisions,
see Supnik, The Bell and Howell : Mamiya Case - Where Now ParallelImports?, 74 TRADE-MARK REP. 1 (1984).
112. The Mamiya mark includes MAMIYA, MAMIYA RB 67, MAMIYA-C,
and MAMIYA-SEKOR. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1164.
113. Id. at 1165.
114. Id. at 1164-65. Osawa-Japan owns 93% of the plaintiff's stock and
Mamiya owns 7% of the plaintiff's stock. Osawa-Japan owns 30% of Mamiya's
stock. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The Second Circuit delineated the test for obtaining a preliminary
injunction in Masel, 719 F.2d at 43. See supra note 124.
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that the plaintiff was entitled to the preliminary injunction. 117
The court analyzed possible reasons for the price differences
between the products sold by the two parties. 1" Defendants argued that the plaintiff's prices were higher because Osawa-Japan
discriminates against United States consumers by charging higher
prices to its United States distributor. 119 The plaintiff argued that
possible reasons for the price differences were sixfold: (1) strength
of the United States dollar against other currencies; 120 (2) cost
factors in producing goods for the United States;' 2 ' (3) plaintiff
incurs substantial costs not incurred by the defendants to protect
and enhance the goodwill of the Mamiya trademark;122 (4) the
plaintiff has an extensive inspection system, thus increasing the
plaintiff's handling expenses; 23 (5) differences in maintenance of
a large inventory of accessories for the Mamiya products; 2 4 and,
125
(6) warranty service for its goods.
In determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the
court first concluded that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable
harm if the injunction were not granted. 6 The court found that
(1) plaintiff's sales had been declining, (2) plaintiff's advertising
was supporting the sale of parallel imports, (3) plaintiff was having to perform warranty work on defendants' goods to avoid consumer confusion, disaffection and resentment, and (4) because
plaintiff's prices are higher than defendants' prices, the consumer
will be confused and charge the plaintiff with price gouging. 127
The court then stated that the remedy of accounting would not
provide sufficient relief to the plaintiff because an accounting will
not protect against consumer confusion, injury to reputation, and

117. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1165.
118. Id. at 1165-68.
119. Id. at 1166.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1166-67.
122. Id. at 1167. The plaintiff paid for national advertising campaigns and
set up service centers. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. To maintain its reputation in the photography business, the plaintiff
had to maintain a large inventory of products, some of which were never ordered. The defendants, however, stocked only those items in high demand. Id.
125. Id. at 1167-68. The court noted that the plaintiff had also been performing free warranty work on defendants' goods to maintain the goodwill of the

MAMIYA mark. Id.
126.
127.

Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1168-69.
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loss of goodwill. 128 Finding greater hardships to the plaintiff and
likelihood of success on the merits, the court granted the prelimi1 29
nary injunction.
The court then discussed the theories of universality, territoriality, and exhaustion' 3" in the context of parallel imports in general and this case in particular.3 " The court rejected the principle
of universality as simplistic and unrealistic, emphasizing that the
principle had been discarded by Congress in enacting section 27
of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 and by the Supreme Court in Katzel. 3 2 The court embraced the principle of territoriality because
it is consistent with the idea that a trademark has a separate legal
existence under each country's laws. The territoriality theory also
acknowledges that a trademark may represent a factually separate goodwill in separate territories.1 33 Noting that the principle
of exhaustion superficially supports the theory of universality, the
court nonetheless stated that when a separate goodwill is present,
the exhaustion of rights is an exhaustion of the rights associated
with a separate mark, but not all of the marks. 34 Addressing defendants' arguments in the case, the court first rejected the contention that the theory of exhaustion should apply. 35 The court
stated that the plaintiff had established a ieparate local goodwill
other than the original trademark and, therefore, exhaustion does
not apply. 36 In response to the charge that the court's interpretation of section 526 "fosters anticompetitive practices, discriminatory pricing and violations of antitrust law and policy,"'137 the
court asserted:
[A] trademark is, like a patent, a monopoly conferred by law. Unquestionably they are susceptible to abuse and to employment in
illegal fashion. When this occurs, the proper remedy is either to
deny enforcement in appropriate instances or to impose liability by
reason of the finding of unfair competition, violation of the antitrust laws or whatever, and not by distortion of the trademark laws

128. Id. at 1169-70.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1170-71.
See supra text accompanying notes 17-24.
Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1171-74.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1174-76.
Id. at 1176.
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in a fashion that will defeat legitimate trademark expectations. 38
The court determined that defendants failed to prove that Customs violated its own regulations by granting the exclusion order
to the plaintiff because the plaintiff and the foreign manufacturer
of the parallel imports are subject to common control.139 Defendants contended that the plaintiff's position in the case would
give an unjustifiable monopoly of United States sales of Mamiya
cameras. 4 ° Last, the court noted that defendants are not barred
from importing Mamiya cameras, but only from infringing on the
4
plaintiff's trademark.1 1
D.

COPIAT

In Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States,"4 2 the plaintiff (COPIAT) brought an action seeking both a declaration that certain Customs Service regulations are inconsistent with the Tariff Act of 1930 and the
Lanham Act, and an order directing that the statutes be enforced
according to their express terms.14 3 The plaintiff, a coalition of
manufacturers and distributors of trademarked products such as
cosmetics, watches, tires, cameras, and electronic goods, claimed
damage from importation and sale of parallel imports in the

138. Id.
139. Id. at 1177; see 19 C.F.R. 133.21(c)(2); see also supra note 67 and accompanying text. The court also found that the defendants had failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1177.
The court noted that it was not necessary to decide at this point whether
Customs exceeded its authority in promulgating the regulations; however, the
court then critically examined the regulations. Id. The court wrote:
The Customs regulations presume antitrust violation without reference

to market considerations, from the sole fact of common control of foreign

and domestic trademark owners. I consider this unsound both as antitrust
policy and as trademark law. More significantly, these crude regulations
denying rights granted by statute seem unnecessary to protect the interests they seek to guard.
Id. at 1178.
140. Id.
141. Id. The court rejected defendants' contention that the plaintiff did not
own the trademark rights and lacked standing. It found that the retention of a
reversionary interest by a trademark transferor did not deny the plaintiff standing in these proceedings. Id. at 1178-79.
142. 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984).
143. Id. at 846.
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United States.' The court allowed K Mart Corporation and 47th
Street Photo to enter the case as intervenor-defendants because
both are engaged in the sale of parallel imports.'4 5
The court first considered the motion to dismiss the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction raised by 47th Street Photo. 4"
47th Street Photo contended that the Court of International
Trade had exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims relating to section 526 of the Tariff Act, and that the plaintiff's claims
based on section 42 of the Lanham Act failed to state a claim on
which relief can be granted. 147 Rejecting these arguments, the
court not only held that the Court of International Trade did not
have exclusive jurisdiction,' 48 but that it had jurisdiction in this
case based on general federal question jurisdiction, 4 9 specific jurisdiction of actions arising under statutes relating to trademarks, 50 and specific jurisdiction for all actions arising under the
Lanham Act. 15 ' The court, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 52 The court dismissed the claims based on section 42 of the Lanham Act for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 53 The court
explained that "section 42 of the Lanham Act clearly applies only
to merchandise bearing counterfeit or spurious trademarks that
'copy or simulate' genuine trademarks.' ' 54
The court's discussion of the case's main issue, whether the
challenged Customs regulations are inconsistent with section 526
of the Tariff Act of 1930,'15 began with the history of section 526
and the Customs regulations. 156 The plaintiff contended examination of the legislative history was unnecessary because the plain
language of the statute controls and is clear on its face. 57 The
144.
145.
146.
147.
it had
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 846-47.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 847-48. In Vivitar, the Court of International Trade decided that
exclusive jurisdiction over a similar claim. See supra note 83.
COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 847.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
598 F. Supp. at 847 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982)).
598 F. Supp. at 847 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982)).
COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 847.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 848.
at 848-49.
at 849-50.
at 850.
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plaintiff claimed that quality of imported goods often differs because fewer controls apply to such goods, and the goods do not
travel through the authorized distribution channels. The plaintiff
further claimed that imported goods damaged their profits due to
the loss of sales. 158 Other injuries claimed by the plaintiff were "a
loss of prestige associated with the selection of distributors, diffusion of promotional efforts, impairment of good will, and the
threat of an untimely end to the fashionable aura of the brand
name.1 159 Defendants countered by offering legislative history as

proof that Congress did not intend to prohibit parallel imports of
goods and that the regulations represent the correct interpretation of the statute. 160 Defendants also contended that parallel imports provide consumers with a legitimate alternative to goods
that come through normal channels. 6 "
The court granted summary judgment for the defendants based
on its finding that the challenged regulations reflect the longstanding practice of Customs, and that the regulations are fully
consistent with Congressional intent.16 2 Furthermore, because
Congress was aware of Customs' interpretation but took no steps
to amend the regulations, Congress apparently approved of the
practice. 163
E. Duracell
The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) recently confronted the issue of parallel imports in a dispute involving the grey marketing of batteries from Europe.164 In August
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 850-51.
Id. at 852.
Id.

164. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, Invest. No. 337-TA-165, USITC Pub.
1616, Nov. 5, 1984) (views of Vice Chairman Liebeler, Commissioner Eckes, and
Commissioner Lodwick) (disapproved by President Reagan, Jan. 4, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Duracell majority]. The ITC has the duty "to investigate the
operation of customs laws, . . . their effect upon the industries and labor of the
country, and to submit reports of its investigations ... ." 19 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(1982). 19 U.S.C. § 1337 contains the ITC's investigation procedure. If the ITC

finds a violation of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, it must transmit that
determination to the President. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982). The President has
60 days from the receipt of the ITC's determination to disapprove it for policy
reasons. If the President rejects the determination, the agency's action has no
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1983, Duracell, Incorporated (Duracell) filed a complaint with the
ITC alleging that the respondents had violated section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930.165 N4 Batteries manufactured by Duracell-

Belgium were being imported by several supply houses into the
United States after the batteries had entered the European
wholesale distribution system."6 6 The ITC found that the importation: (1) infringed on Duracell's trademark under the common
law of trademarks; (2) violated section 42 of the Lanham Act;
(3) violated section 32(1) of the Lanham Act; (4) constituted a
misappropriation of trade dress; (5) falsely designated the origin
of the goods; and (6) violated the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act.

16 7

Discussing the infringement of a registered trademark, the ITC
framed the issue as whether the parallel importation of goods
without the consent or license of the United States trademark
owner is an unfair act or unfair method of competition under section 337.16 After considering the theories of universality and territoriality, the ITC majority noted that the theory of territoriality
incorporates the concepts that the primary function of a trademark is to symbolize the goodwill that the domestic trademark
effect. If the President takes no action or approves the determination, the
agency's determination becomes final. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1982).
165. Duracell majority, supra note 164, at 2. Section 337 of the Tariff Act
provides:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or
substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in
the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or
to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are
declared unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist shall be
dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of law, as provided in this
section.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982).
166. DuracellMajority, supra note 164, at 5. Duracell-Belgium is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Duracell International, a Delaware corporation, which in
turn is a wholly owned subsidiary of Duracell. Id. at 4.
167. Id. at 6.
168. Id. The ITC also asserted that article 6(3) of the Paris Convention deals
with parallel imports. See id. at 11. Article 6(3) provides that "[a] mark duly
registered in a country of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks
registered in the other countries of the Union, including the country of origin."
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, done July 14, 1967,
T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (revising Convention signed on Mar. 20, 1883).
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owner has developed, and that a trademark has a separate legal
existence in each country.16 9 The Duracell majority then stated
that courts following the universality principle are in error because a trademark performs a function other than the prevention
of public confusion. 170 According to the majority, sales of imported batteries deprived Duracell of profits as a return on its
goodwill.17 ' The ITC then held that the common law affords a
remedy for infringement of a trademark-holder's territorial right,
and that this remedy is independent of the Customs law or the
Lanham Act. Thus, no challenge to the Customs' interpretation of
section 526 was necessary. 7 2 The Duracell majority also found no
violation of section 526 of the Tariff Act because Congress intended section 526 to apply only where a foreign company sells
trademark rights to a United States company; therefore, the majority deferred to the interpretation of section 526 in the lower
17 3
court's decision in Vivitar.

Reviewing the Supreme Court's interpretation of trademark
laws, the ITC then found a violation of section 42 of the Lanham
Act.1 74 The ITC also found a likelihood of confusion "as to the
sponsorship of the batteries at the point of sale" and, therefore
that a violation of section 32(1) of the Lanham Act existed.'

169. Duracell majority, supra note 164, at 6-7.
170. Id. at 13.
171. Id. at 17-18.
172. Id. at 19.
173. Id. at 21. See supra notes 83-109 and accompanying text (discussing
Vivitar).
174. Duracell majority, supra note 164, at 23. The ITC noted that it was not
barred from interpreting trademark law by Customs' interpretation of trademark law. Id. at 22. It rejected the argument that Congress intended to adopt
Customs' interpretation when it enacted the wording of section 27 of the TradeMark Act of 1905 into section 42 of the Lanham Act. Id. at 23. The ITC held
that they were bound by the Supreme Court's interpretation of trademark law.
Id.
175. Id. at 23-33. Section 32(1) provides:
[a]ny person who shall, without the consent of the registrant - (a) use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; ...
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant. ...
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982). The ITC found that the trademark was copied, that the
copy was used in connection with the sale of goods, and that the copying caused
confusion. Duracell majority, supra note 164, at 22-23. Although the Belgian
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Furthermore, the Duracell majority found a misappropriation
of the plaintiff's trade dress and false designation of origin. 17 6 The
ITC stated that the term "origin" is not limited to the manufacturer but also encompasses the distribution chain. 177 The ITC
found an injury as required by section 337 because Duracell was
deprived of goodwill benefits, and the loss of sales was a loss of
sales to the United States industry.' The ITC then determined
that the proper remedy would be a general exclusion order,' 79 and
that the public interest did not preclude the issuance of such an
order. 18 0
Vice Chairman Liebeler additionally expressed her views that
parallel imports violate section 526 of the Tariff Act.' 8 ' She believed that the plain meaning of the statute should be controlling
and that Customs' interpretation of section 526 was incorrect.8 2
Vice Chairman Liebeler stated that any interpretation of section
526, which is only applicable to transactions between related corntrademark was not a "copy" at the time the trademark was applied to the goods,
the ITC found that the trademark became a copy upon importation and sale in
the United States. Id. at 24-26.
176. Duracell majority, supra note 164, at 33-34.
177. Id. at 34. The ITC found that all but one of the respondents failed to
comply with the fair packaging and labelling provisions. Id. at 35.
178. Id. at 35-37. The question is whether a United States industry, not a
United States company, is injured. Id. at 35. In addition to causing lost sales,
parallel imports had injured Duracell's United States distribution system and
caused lower production. Id. at 37.
179. Id. at 37-41. The ITC found that Duracell had shown a "widespread
pattern of unauthorized importation and sale of the infringing batteries." Id. at
38. It further found that altering the labelling would not prevent public confusion. Id. at 40.
180. Id. at 41-44. The arguments against issuing a general exclusion order
were that: (1) it would impair the competitive conditions in the United States;
and (2) it would allow Duracell to discriminate in pricing between the two markets. Id. at 41-43. The arguments in favor of issuing a general exclusion order
were: (1) trademarks act as a guarantee of quality, and, because of this assurance of quality, consumers are willing to pay a premium price that serves as an
incentive to produce high quality goods; (2) an exclusion order would protect the
integrity of Duracell's trademark and in turn protect the entire trademark system; and (3) important warnings on the packages of imported goods were not in
English. Id. at 43-44. Section 337(d) requires that the public interest be considered when a general exclusion order is granted. Id.
181. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, Invest. No. 337-TA-165, USITC Pub.
1616 at 1 (Nov. 5, 1984) (Additional Views of Vice Chairman Liebeler) [hereinafter cited as Liebeler].
182. Id.
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panies, is improperly premised on the theory of universality
which ignores the independent goodwill that a trademark can represent. 18 3 Liebeler wrote that, although violating a trademark
might lower prices in the short-run, the long-run effect is reduc8 4
tion of investments in trademarks.1
Chairman Stern and Commissioner Rohr filed a "dissenting"
opinion.18 5 Although agreeing that section 337 had been violated, 8 6 they did not view section 526 of the Tariff Act and section 42 of the Lanham Act as appropriate subject matter for an
action under section 337 of the Tariff Act.8 17 They asserted that
the Customs Service had not only established separate procedures
for dealing with conflicts under these statutory sections,'8 8 but
also that even if section 526 were available it would not apply in
this case.1 19 The Duracell dissent agreed that the principle of territoriality is part of United States law, but stated that the territoriality theory should only be used to define an identical mark as a
separate mark that copies or simulates a United States trademark. 10 0 The dissent also determined that there had been violations of section 337.191 The dissent, however, disagreed with the
general exclusion order, advocating that a solution to the problem
of parallel imports requires a balancing of interests; therefore,
Congress, not the ITC, is the more appropriate forum for the

183. Id. at 3.
184. Id. at 4. Liebeler agreed that a general exclusion order is in the public
interest because it provides: "1) a clear and unambiguous rule; 2) an incentive to
develop foreign markets; 3) the benefits of economies of scale in the investment
in trademarks and advertising; 4) an incentive to invest in trademarks; 5) an
incentive to develop high quality goods; and 6) an incentive to maintain the
quality of goods." Id.

185. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, Invest. No. 337-TA-165, USITC Pub.
1616 (Nov. 5, 1984) (View of Chairman Stern and Commissioner Rohr) [hereinafter cited as Duracell dissent].
186. Id. at 1.
187. Id. at 3-7.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 8-11. The Duracell dissent stated that "section 526 is applicable
only to the circumstances of the sale of U.S. trademark rights by a foreign company to an independent U.S. firm. Because no such sale is involved in this case
.section 526 [would be] inapplicable." Id. at 8 (citation omitted). The dissent
also stated that section 42 of the Lanham Act would not apply in this case because it only applies in situations involving unrelated companies. See id. at 1117.
190. Id. at 14.
191. Id. at 1.
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solution.1 92

On January 4, 1985, President Reagan disapproved the ITC's
determination in In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, stating that
failure to disapprove could be construed as a change in policy.1 13
In his disapproval, the President stated:
The Commission's interpretation of section 42 of the Lanham Act
(15 U.S.C. 1124), one of several grounds for the Commission's determination, is at odds with the longstanding regulatory interpretation by the Department of the Treasury. . . . The Administration
has advanced the Treasury Department's interpretation in a number of pending court cases. Recent decisions [in COPIAT and Vivitar] explicitly uphold the Treasury Department's interpretation.
Allowing the Commission's determination in this case to stand
could be viewed as an alteration of that interpretation. I, therefore,
19 4
have decided to disapprove the Commission's determination.
F.

El Greco

The plaintiff, El Greco, the owner of the United States trade-

mark CANDIE'S for shoes, sought a permanent injunction to restrain defendant, Shoe World, from using this mark. 95 The defendant was selling shoes with the CANDIE'S mark through its
discount shoe stores for $13.88.196 The plaintiff alleged unfair
competition, violation of the Lanham Act, violation of section 526
of the Tariff Act of 1930, and violations of several New York state
statutory provisions."'
192. Id. at 17-45.
193. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to Paula Stern, Chairman, United
States International Trade Commission (Jan. 4, 1985). The President
commented:
The Departments of Treasury and Commerce, on behalf of the Cabinet
Council on Commerce and Trade, have solicited data from the public concerning the issue of parallel market importation and are reviewing responses with a view toward formulating a cohesive policy in this area. Failure to disapprove the Commission's determination could be viewed as a
change in the current policy prior to the completion of this process.
Id.
194. Id.
195. El Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380,
1383 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The plaintiff also holds the New York state registration
for the same mark. Id. at 1383.
196. Id. at 1384.
197. Id. at 1383. The court found none of the New York state laws applicable. Id. at 1394-96. The New York anti-dilution statute did not apply because
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Plaintiff, through an exclusive agent, engaged several Brazilian
shoe manufacturers to produce certain styles of women's shoes
bearing the CANDIE'S trademark.1 9 When the plaintiff rejected
some of the shipments of shoes from these Brazilian manufacturers, the manufacturers would then sell the goods to the defendant.19 9 El Greco contended that it had rejected the shipments
because the shoes were defective and thus were not genuine
goods. 20 0 The court noted that the plaintiff never told the defendant how to dispose of the rejected goods, and that the contract
between the parties contained no provision addressing the
situation.2 °1
The plaintiff based its trademark claims on violations of sections 32, 43(a), and 44(g) of the Lanham Act.20 2 The court found
that section 44(g) of the Lanham Act was inapplicable because its
purpose is to extend trade protection to foreign trademark owners
whose home countries are members of trade protection treaties
with the United States. 20 3 The court stated that section 32(1) of
the Lanham Act "prohibits the use of a trademark (1) without
consent, (2) in connection with the sale of goods, [and] (3) in a
manner that is likely to cause confusion or to deceive the purchaser as to the source or origin of the goods. ' 204 The court noted
that section 43(a) prohibits the use in connection with any goods
or services of a false designation of origin or any false description
or representation, and, under either section 32(1) or 43(a), a
showing of likelihood of confusion is required. 20 5 Agreeing with

the plaintiff offered no proof of dilution because of the defendant's actions. Id.
at 1395-96. The New York trademark infringement law requires a showing of

likelihood of confusion to find a violation. The court found that the plaintiff
failed to make this showing. Id. at 1396. Finally, the court found that the plaintiff failed to establish the necessary fraudulent intent under a New York law
that covers "violations against trade-marks." Id.

198. Id. at 1384.
199. Id. at 1384-85.
200. Id. at 1385. The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove these
facts. The evidence indicated that the plaintiff refused many of the shipments

for late delivery and reasons other than defective quality. Id. at 1386.
201. Id. at 1392.

202. Id. at 1390. These provisions are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a),
and 1126(g) (1982).
203. El Greco, 599 F. Supp. at 1391.
204. Id. at 1390.
205. Id. The court defined likelihood of confusion as whether "an appreciable number of purchasers [are] likely to be misled as to the source or sponsor-
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the defendant's contentions, the court ruled that genuine goods
could not be considered infringing goods. 20 6 The court then deter-

mined that the "unauthorized sale of genuine goods cannot give
to maintain a federal
rise to the likelihood of confusion'20 necessary
7
trademark infringement action.

Plaintiff's final claim was that the defendant's actions constituted a violation of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930.208 The
defendant first contended that section 526 would not apply in
this case because it was intended to protect United States trademark owners who obtained a trademark right from the owner of
the foreign trademark. 20 9 The court found that section 526 did

not apply because El Greco had control over the CANDIE'S
trademark and had not obtained the mark from the Brazilian
manufacturers. For these reasons, the court found that this case
did not fall under the intended protection of section 526.210
IV.

ANALYSIS

A court's choice of a trademark theory often determines the
outcome of a parallel importation case. The universality theory
presents a rather simplistic view of trademarks. This theory views
the manufacturer as the origin of all products, regardless of the
ship of defendant's products." Id.
206. Id. at 1394. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on DEP Corp.
v. Interstate Cigar Co., 622 F.2d 621, 622 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (dictum that trademark infringement would not be found in cases involving genuine goods). The
court also relied on Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (American) Corp.,
707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying California law). Monte Carlo arose when
a United States purchaser of genuine shirts refused delivery of the goods. The
defendant then sold the shirts to a discount retailer with the trademarks still
intact. Monte Carlo, 707 F.2d at 1054-58. The court held that no trademark
infringement occurred because the goods were manufactured and imported
under the plaintiff's authority; therefore, the court found the goods to be genuine. Id.
207. El Greco, 599 F. Supp. at 1394. The plaintiff also asserted a state common law claim of unfair competition. The court held that the cause of action
requires a likelihood of confusion to exist, and the court found no confusion in
this case because the goods were genuine. Id. at 1394-95.
208. Id. at 1396. The court traced the history of section 526 from Katzel to
the Vivitar decision. This court agreed with the lower court's interpretation of
section 526 in Vivitar. Id. at 1400-01. For a discussion of Vivitar, see supra
notes 83-109 and accompanying text.
209. El Greco, 599 F. Supp. at 1396-97.
210. Id. at 1397-98.
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distribution chain and any established local goodwill. 11 Under
the territoriality theory, the manufacturer is not necessarily the
origin of all goods; thus, distributors and licensees of the trademark are protected. This theory recognizes that a separate goodwill can be established by each link in the marketing chain of a
product. Each entity along the chain, therefore, is equally deserving of trademark protection.212
Under the theory of universality, the country in which the
goods are manufactured, or the country into which the goods are
imported, is irrelevant because the trademark is given worldwide
protection. 1 The court in El Greco held that, because the goods
were manufactured under the plaintiff's control, there was no infringement or unfair competition. 214 This reasoning and applica-

tion of the universality theory echoes decisions reached in the late
nineteenth century before adoption of extensive trademark protection laws.215
The theory of territoriality considers all three functions of a
trademark and is concerned with the separate goodwill established by distributors, wholesalers, and retailers. 1 6 The Osawa
decision discussed ways in which a separate local goodwill could
be established and how separate goodwill can cause differences in
product prices. Different standards for inspecting goods for some
markets, warranty service, and advertising can all establish a separate goodwill.217 This goodwill is not the product of manufacture
but is established in the distribution chain. Local goodwill can be
harmed if products which do not offer these same benefits are
marketed under the same trademark. This harm to goodwill is
irreparable, and protection should be provided for the trademark
18
owner.

2

Regardless of the theory applied, however, the Lanham Act test
for trademark infringement must be applied. This test is not
whether the goods are genuine, but whether the consumer is
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
supra notes 195-210 and accompanying text.
supra notes 25-28, 30 and accompanying text (discussing Apol-

linaris and Gretsch).
216. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 110-26 and accompanying text; see also Osawa, 589 F.
Supp. at 1172-73.
218. See supra text accompanying note 129.
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likely to be confused about the origin or nature of the goods. In
the lower court's decision in Vivitar,1 9 the court concluded that
the consumer would not be confused about the sale of cameras
imported on the parallel market because the court assumed that
the consumer would not know where the cameras were manufactured. The Vivitar court, however, failed to address the issue of
whether the consumer would know the differences in services and
warranties between the goods. The ITC in the Duracell investigation,220 contrastingly, assumed that consumers would not be able
to differentiate between parallel import goods and goods reaching
them through authorized channels. The ITC also determined that
price and quality differences in the products will lead to consumer confusion and harm the goodwill that has been established
by the trademark owner. 221 The Lanham Act was enacted to protect the public from product confusion by providing greater protection for trademarks. The purposes of the Act are more closely
followed by strict application of the test for infringement.
Another means of challenging parallel importation of goods is
by use of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930.222 The plain language of section 526, enacted in reaction to the appellate court
decision in Katzel, does not allow parallel imports.2 2 3 Nonetheless, those who attempt to apply the statute disagree about the
relevance of the legislative history of section 526 and its interpretation by Customs. Both the court in COPIAT and the lower
court in Vivitar concluded that the primary factor in determining
Congressional intent was the legislative history. 22 4 In both cases,
the courts also emphasized the interpretation of section 526 by
Customs. 25 The legislative history and agency interpretation
should only be examined if some ambiguity on the face of the
statute exists. The legislative history of section 526 is very brief
because of limited debate, and there was confusion about the section's scope. 228 The court of appeals in Vivitar recognized the
problems with the legislative history and concluded that too

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
434-35.
225.
226.

See supra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 164-94.
Duracell majority, supra note 164, at 12.
See supra text accompanying note 36.
See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text; Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at
See supra text accompanying notes 88-93 and 155-63.
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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much weight should not be placed on the legislative history in
interpreting section 526.227 The interpretation of section 526 by

the Customs Service is equally inconclusive. Although some
courts would argue that longstanding agency practice constitutes
Congressional approval of the interpretation, others would argue
that Congress' failure to pass the Celler Bill, which would have
allowed parallel imports, demonstrates that Congress disapproves
of Customs' interpretation.228 Until Congress clearly manifests its
intent, the plain language of section 526 should be applied to all
cases involving parallel imports.
V.

CONCLUSION

Conflicts in interpretations of section 42 of the Lanham Act
and section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 have led to divergent
results in several federal courts. Although advocates on each side
of the controversy present valid arguments supporting their positions, the dispute should be resolved by analyzing the purpose of
the Lanham Act and the Tariff Act. The goal of these acts is protection of consumers and United States industry. Strict application of these statutes would achieve this result. Parallel imports
provide goods at lower prices but confuse the consumer as to the
origin of the goods and the warranties and services that accompany the goods. This confusion clearly fails the Lanham Act test
for trademark infringement. Parallel importation also undermines
the value of the trademark investment, thereby harming the
owner of the United States trademark. Until some clear congressional action is taken to clarify the present situation involving
parallel imports, courts should interpret section 42 of the Lanham
Act and section 526 of the Tariff Act to protect both the consumer and the owner of the Unites States trademark. Such an
interpretation would follow most closely the original purpose of
both acts.
W. Weldon Wilson

227. See supra text accompanying notes 101-05.
228. See supra note 63.

